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Chapter 1: Mobility in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro 
(RMRJ) 
 A Portrait of Daily Commutes 
 V 
 V lives in Padre Miguel, a neighborhood in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro.  
He is in his early 20s and a student at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 
attending courses every evening at the Praia Vermelha campus.  He is also working as 
an intern during the day in Flamengo.  
V’s commute starts with a short walk to the Mocidade/Padre Miguel train 
station, where he catches the train in the direction of Central.  The trains are usually 
extremely crowded in the mornings, and it is not uncommon for him to have to wait for 
a second train to pass, which may take up to 10 minutes to come.  He never gets a seat, 
he says.  And in the off chance one comes available, he generally leaves it for someone 
else.  He says that there is an attitude among riders that students should not sit since the 
government subsidizes their fares.  V seems to disagree with this logic, stating that his 
fare is paid by his internship and not the government.  “But it is kind of a moot point.  
There are never any seats in the morning.”  Despite being overcrowded, V says that at 
least all of the trains on his line1 have air conditioning now.    
After a 45 minute train ride V arrives at Central.  From there he can change to 
either a bus or the Metro to get to his internship in Flamengo.  Although a bus would be 
less crowded, he opts for the Metro because it is faster and nicer, with subways passing 
every 2-3 minutes.  He rides the subway to the Flamengo station and then finishes his 
                                                
1 Train Line: Central-Santa Cruz 
2 
journey with a 5 minute walk to his job.  In total, he says the trip is 40 kilometers and 
takes about 1 hour 20 minutes.  If he was to take the bus from Central, the total time 
increases to over 2 hours.   
From work V takes and a bus to the university.  He says that it usually takes 
about 20 minutes and is generally not crowded.  
After classes V starts the journey back home.  This direction, he takes the bus to 
Central (he leaves after 10pm so there is little traffic) and then the train.  He generally 
catches the last train, which he says tends to be crowded but is never full.  He also has 
to wait longer for the train to leave the station (up to 20 minutes).  Plus, after 9:00pm 
there are only trains that stop at every station (as opposed to direct trains).  After about 
45 minutes he disembarks at the Guilherme da Silveira station, which is 1.5 kilometers 
from his house.  Although it is not the closest station, he has to get off here because the 
Padre Miguel station is unsafe at night.  From here he either walks home or is picked up 
by his father who drives him home.   
In total, V spends more than 3 hours per day on public transportation, at a cost 
of R$ 19.10 per day.  Assuming 22 workdays per month, V spends R$ 420.20 per 
month just to get to and from work and school.  This is just over 50% of the monthly 
minimum wage, which is currently R$ 800/month. 
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Figure 1.  Map of V's Home-Work-School Commute 
 
A 
A is mid career professional working in IT in Ipanema.  He lives in the working 
class neighborhood São Gonçalo (across the bay) and drives to work every day.  When 
asked about his commute, A said that he generally leaves home at 8:00am and it takes 
him anywhere from 50 minutes to 2 hour and 20 minutes to arrive at work in Ipanema.  
Between 50 minutes and 1 hour and 20 minutes he classifies as “good traffic;” 1 hour 
and 20 minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes, “busy traffic;” 1 hour 45 minutes to 2 hours 
and 20 minutes, “really bad traffic.”  Once in Ipanema he parks his car on the street, 
generally paying about R$ 6.  He says that parking is usually easy because people who 
live in Ipanema all leave in the morning to drive themselves to work.  The only 
exception is in the summer, when it can be more difficult.  Going home takes less time, 
but can still take up to 2 hours if he leaves work during the peak of rush hour (around 
6:00pm).  He normally leaves after 7:00pm.          
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In total A says he spends around R$ 750 per month just on his transport to and 
from work.  Again, assuming 22 workdays per month, the cost breakdown is as follows:    
130 BRL/week on gasoline (ethanol) x 4 weeks = 520 
3.70 BRL bridge toll Niteroi-Rio x 22 = 81.40 
11 BRL/month for the convenience of using automatic payment at toll = 11 
6 BRL/day for parking = 132 
TOTAL =  R$ 744.442 
 Although costly, there are several reasons A chooses to drive himself instead of 
taking public transportation.  He says when it comes to public transportation from his 
house he has two options.  He could take a “frescão”3 until Centro and then take the 
Metro to Ipanema.  He says this option is ok from a time and comfort level, but it nearly 
the same price as driving himself, without the convenience.  The “frescão” costs R$ 
11.50 and the Metro is R$ 4.10.4 This adds up to R$ 31.20 per day, or R$ 686.40 per 
month.  
 His other option of public transportation would be to take a bus from his home 
to the boat terminal in Niteroi, cross the bay by ferry, walk from the Rio boat terminal 
at Praça XV to the Carioca metro station, and then take the metro to Ipanema.  When 
asked about this option he simply said, “forget it.  I would spend my whole life going to 
work by boat every day.” 
                                                
2 This amount does not include wear and tear on the car. 
3 “Frescao” is a special bus that is much higher quality and makes fewer stops.  It is 
easily recognizable by its dark blue color and only one door at the front of the bus. 
4 The fares are not integrated so each must be paid in full. 
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Figure 2.  Map of A's Home-Work Commute 
 
R 
R is a late 20s professional, working as an analyst at an oil and gas consultancy 
firm in Centro.  He lives in Ipanema and takes the Metro to and from work everyday.  
He says that on his typical morning he wakes up around 8:00am and leaves for work 
between 8:20-8:30am.  He walks from his apartment to the General Osório Metro 
Station, about 10 minutes, takes the subway until Cinêlandia (the first stop in Centro), 
and then walks 2 minutes to his office, which is only a block from the Cinêlandia 
Square.  In total, his trip is 30 minutes and costs R$ 8.20 per day.  When asked about 
the quality and comfort of his trip, he says it is fine, but complains about the heat.  In 
the morning, he always gets a seat5 and passes the time on his rides to work by drawing.  
                                                
5 General Osório is the first stop on the line, where the line originates. 
6 
On the way home, he says it is very crowded and he always stands.  Still, he arrives 
home by 7:00pm everyday, spending just over an hour on his round trip commute. 
 
Figure 3.  Map of R's Home-Work Commute 
 
D 
 D lives in the municipality of Magé, part of the area known as the “Baixada 
Fluminense.”  The municipality has grown rapidly, tripling the number of inhabitants 
over the past fifty years (IBGE b.).  It is a working class area, with over 50% of the 
population coming from the “classe C” or “classe D.”6  
 D works as a nanny/domestic helper for two different households in the South 
Zone of Rio, one in Ipanema and the other in Leblon.  In order to arrive at her job by 
8:00am, she starts her commute at 4:30am every morning.  After a string of rapes in her 
neighborhood, she and the neighbor ladies leave their houses together every morning to 
                                                
6 In Brazil, social class is defined by income and is categorized in an A-B-C-D-E 
system.  
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walk to the bus stop.  She says she generally waits up to 20 minutes for the bus to pass, 
but gets a seat since it is so early.  After about an hour-long ride, she gets off the bus in 
Duque de Caxias and walks to the Gramacho train station.  Here she gets on the train 
and rides until Central.  At Central she switches to the Metro Line 1 and rides to the 
final stop, General Osório.  From there, she switches to the Metro Bus and gets off 
further in Ipanema or rides to the final stop in Leblon, depending on which house she is 
working at that day.  In total, the trip takes about 3 hours.  
 At 5pm, she starts the journey again in the opposite direction.  However, 
because it is rush hour and everyone is trying to leave the city, everything is much more 
crowded and takes longer.  She waits in a long line to catch the Metro Bus, just to get 
on a packed Metro and then a packed train.  She normally arrives home between 8:30 
and 9:00pm. 
 In total, D spends nearly 7 hours and R$ 21.20 per day on her home-work 
commute.  Using the “Bilhete Unico” card, she pays the maximum, R$ 6.50, for the 
intermunicipal bus and the train.  However, since only one transfer is allowed on the 
card, she must pay the Metro fare in full, an additional R$ 4.10.7  This adds up to R$ 
466.40 per month.  Her employers cover her transport costs, a practice that is customary 
in the city.  
                                                
7 The Metro and Metro Bus are covered by one fare.  
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Figure 4.  Map of D's Home-Work Commute 
 
Introduction 
The Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro’s (RMRJ) urban mobility system 
directly affects the quality of life of its inhabitants and its visitors, and it raises debates 
about the design and management of transport systems and land use adopted by the 
government.  The debate surrounding this issue gained momentum on the national scene 
with the outbreak of demonstrations in June 2013, which led hundreds of thousands of 
people to protest in more than one hundred cities around Brazil.  Protests started with 
outrage over the increase in the fare price for public transportation, especially in light of 
9 
the poor quality of service.  In Rio, the Free Fare Movement (MPL) led the charge, 
arguing not only that the increased fare was abusive, but that all fares act as a barrier to 
urban mobility.  
According to the Index of Urban Wellbeing, prepared by the Observatory of the 
Metropolises8 in 2013, among 15 metropolitan regions in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro 
received the worst rating for the “urban mobility aspect,” being below the national 
average in all dimensions examined (Ribeiro and Ribeiro 2013).  Below is a map 
showing the levels of mobility within the metropolitan region, dark blue being the best 
and dark red being the worst.   
 
Figure 5.  “Urban Mobility - Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro - 2010" 
(Ribeiro and Ribeiro 2013) 
 
                                                
8 Indice de Bem-Estar Urbano pelo Observatório das Metrópoles 
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Because urban mobility is a factor that if not managed effectively can negatively 
affect the population's quality of life, building a strategic and sustainable transport 
system is an important feature for the development of society.  A 2010 study of the 
RMRJ found that when comparing average incomes of similar workers, in terms of 
education, color, sex and type of occupation, who reside in areas with varying degrees 
of urban mobility, income differentials can reach 22.8% (Ribeiro and Silva 2010).  
Thus, movements within and around the city are not only a technical matter of traffic 
engineering, but have economic and social implications as well.  The difficulties faced 
by citizens in their daily commutes create barriers, especially for the poorest, who 
generally live far from the areas that contain the best opportunities for work and study.  
The most notable result caused by the existence of a poor public transport 
system is that the process of social exclusion is further aggravated (Pero and Mihessen 
2012).  For Kenyon, Lyons and Rafferty, social exclusion is "the process by which 
people are prevented from participating in the economic, political and social life of the 
community because of reduced accessibility to opportunities, services and social 
networks, due in whole or in part to insufficient mobility in a society and environment 
built around the assumption of high mobility” (Kenyon, Lyons and Rafferty 2001, 
p.210).  Therefore, urban mobility becomes a precondition for social inclusion, or the 
participation of citizens in the society (Farrington and Farrington 2005).  In this sense, 
"social exclusion is not due to a lack of social opportunities but a lack of access to those 
opportunities" (Preston and Raje 2007, p.153).  
In this paper, I evaluate urban mobility in the Metropolitan Region of Rio de 
Janeiro, giving special consideration to the public transport system, in order to answer 
11 
the question of whether or not Rio’s mobility system leads to greater social inclusion or 
exclusion.  My work fits into the larger academic scholarship on the Right to the City, 
which is a radical call for a transformed and renewed right to urban life.  It is “the right 
to create a different, inclusive and livable city, [and] requires the formulations and 
appropriations of these different uses of spaces by civil society; citizens taking control 
of urban planning” (Lefebvre 1996, p. 173).  Although urban planning encompasses 
many aspects, mobility is a foundational concern.  If addressed properly it can serve to 
bring society together and contribute to the participation of the population in local 
development.  Addressed properly in this sense means not in isolation.  Urban mobility 
should be seen in a comprehensive manner, requiring not only transport related 
solutions, but also solutions relating to land use and planning.  However, when mobility 
is restricted, as in Rio, there is no social inclusion, and for those not included, there is 
no real right to the city.  The mobility system in the RMRJ does not serve those who are 
most in need of it.  Instead, the poor public transport system further aggravates social 
exclusion.   
In the first chapter I will briefly discuss the Right to the City and Rio de 
Janeiro’s emergence as a metropolitan region, looking specifically at the resulting 
spatial configuration of its growth.  The second half of the chapter looks at the urban 
mobility indicators of the metropolitan region. 
The second chapter examines the principal modes of transportation in the city, 
briefly discussing their history and the quality of their service today. 
The third chapter discusses the social impacts of urban mobility and 
accessibility. 
12 
The fourth and final chapter looks at the fight for a better transport system, 
offers policy recommendations and the conclusion. 
 
The Right to the City 
 The Right to the City is a concept first developed by Henry Lefebvre in his 1968 
book, Le Droit à la Ville.  He created it as a reaction to problems that modern 
urbanization produced in the city, such as urban sprawl and social segregation.  Today, 
it is one of the more important concepts in urban scholarship and has been enriched by 
some of Lefebvre’s contemporaries, such as Harvey, Soja, Dikec, Marcuse and Mitchell 
(Ockman 1992).  In its original conception, “the right to the city cannot be conceived of 
as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities.  It can only be formulated as 
a transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Lefebvre 2000, p. 158).  At its core, the 
Right to the City is the right to inhabit the city, the right of everyone to participate in all 
aspects of social life.  
 Others have gone even further.  For Harvey, 
“the right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban 
resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city.  It is, moreover, 
a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably 
depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of 
urbanization.”  (Harvey 2008)  
Dikec stresses the element of collective restructuring of the city in his definition as well. 
“The Right to the City implies not only the participation of the urban citizen in 
urban social life, but, more importantly, his or her active participation in the 
political life, management, and administration of the city…  The right to the 
city, therefore, is not simply a participatory right but, more importantly, an 
enabling right, to be defined and refined through political struggle.  It is not only 
a right to urban space, but to a political space as well, constituting the city as a 
space of politics.”  (Dikec 2001, p. 1790)  
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As presented above, in the same way that the development of the city impacts people’s 
right to the city, the right to the city impacts a city’s development.  They both also 
stresses people’s role as political beings, with the ability to make and change the cities 
in which they live.   
Using the above definitions, there are a large number of social movements all 
around the world who have appropriated the idea of the Right to the City for their 
various causes.  According to Marcuse, it “has become a major formulation of 
progressive demand for social change around the world” (Marcuse 2009, p. 246).  One 
such group is the Free Fare Movement, MPL, who invokes the idea of the Right to the 
City in its fight for a better and more just transport system.  However, what makes the 
MPL different from other groups who use the concept is that in Brazil the idea has been 
written into law. 
The City Statute (Federal Law 10.257, passed in 2001) is premised in the Right 
to the City and seeks to regulate the full development of the social functions of the city 
and urban properties.  One of it key elements is 
“democratic management, i.e., the city population participating in the urban 
management, establishing a series of instruments and deliberative and 
consultative bodies, through which the civil society, especially the historically 
marginalized and politically and economically excluded groups, can participate 
in the decision-making process regarding the cities’ future.”  (Junior, Zarate and 
Emanuelli 2014, p. 14)    
 
Therefore, the MPL is not only invoking the concept of the Right to the City, but a 
Constitutionally guaranteed right as well. 
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The Emergence of the RMRJ 
Since the second half of the twentieth century, Brazil has established itself as an 
urban country, in which the major urban areas have either continuously grown, or at 
least maintained their populations.  Although Brazilian cities do not have the same 
dramatic demographic growth registered in past decades, both the 2000 and 2010 
censuses registered over 80% urban population in the country as a whole, which 
corresponded to 160 million urban residents in 2010 (IBGE a.).  These 160 million 
people are spread over 5,000 municipalities in Brazil, and about 32 million live in the 
metropolitan regions of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.  Furthermore, the United Nations 
estimates that the country will reach 90% urbanization rate in the next 5 years (Maciel 
2014).   
Not only has the last 50 years been characterized by the permanence of 
population concentration in major cities, there has also been the emergence of new 
urban centers around the country.  Despite differences in the various metropolitan 
regions, it is possible to map a general trend of territorial expansion.  “From the 1950s 
until the late 1980s, Brazil experienced a developmental period marked by the 
expansion of cities without basic infrastructure and with poor living conditions, the 
informality and self-building resulting from this marked the Brazilian development 
model” (Junior, Zarate and Emanuelli 2014).  Additionally, in all cases, the peripheries 
have had higher growth rates than the urban centers.  Yet, the centers have maintained 
the highest concentration of jobs, putting extra pressure on these areas.  Thus, the trend 
over the last several decades is an increase in urban sprawl, with a considerable 
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decrease in urban population density (Ribeiro, Silva and Rodrigues 2011; Rodrigues 
2012).  
“The regulatory planning, founded on the belief that the drafting of the urban 
policy should happen under a technical sphere of public administration, instead 
of reverting this picture, accentuated its effects.  The technocratic management 
fuelled a process characterized by the private appropriation of public 
investments and the segregation of large population groups in favelas, tenement 
houses and peripheric subdivisions, excluded from the consumption of urban 
goods and essential services.”  (Bassul in Junior, Zarate and Emanuelli 2014)  
 
The case of the Rio de Janeiro metropolis, the second largest in terms of 
population size in Brazil, is no different.  Rio has also experienced this trend of strong 
urban expansion, with urban population density in decline.  With over 11 million people 
distributed in 21 municipalities, overall population growth has been about 1% per year 
for the past 20 years (IBGE b.).  However, while this statistic confirms some 
demographic stability, it falls short in that it does not show the spatial distribution of 
growth.  If it did, it would show high growth rates in most peripheral areas.  
This growth in the periphery has helped to consolidate Rio de Janeiro as a 
metropolitan city, marked by the frenetic pace of movement of both people and goods.  
However, it also made the question of urban mobility increasingly challenging.  Since 
the 1950s, the bus had become the most used mode of public transportation.  The 
government favored buses over the tram system, which started in the late 1800s, 
because of their lower initial investment and the ability to easily create new routes as 
the city spread.  Still, formal transport modes were not able to meet demand, especially 
in the periphery, leaving an opening for informal modes to emerge.  These informal 
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modes, mainly vans, “pirate” buses and motorcycles taxis, spread rapidly during the 
1990s.9   
According to an article published by the O Globo newspaper in November 2000, 
alternative transportation carried more passengers than the metro and the train, totaling 
about 550,000 passengers per day, with about 8,000 vehicles.  According to data 
provided by the secretary of transport of the city of Rio de Janeiro, the number of vans 
registered in the city hall exceeded 8,350 vehicles (Barbosa, Ferreira and Filho 2003). 
Starting in the late 1990s, the government tried to start regulating, formalizing 
and integrating the informal transport sector to mixed success.  In 2008 the state 
government issued new regulations for “low capacity transport,” which states that vans 
cannot compete with buses and fares must be at least 10% higher.  Additionally, vans 
must carry least 16 passengers, be air conditioned, and drivers must licensed.   
“Despite the efforts to formalize these services, the great majority of vans 
continue to operate informally, because the rules are not fully obeyed.  Under 
this state regulation, a total of 639 vans have been licensed.  However, according 
to information from the main actors involved in informal transport, the total fleet 
in operation in the entire state (excluding the city of Rio) is around 3,500, 
revealing the continuing situation of prevailing informality.”  (Balassiano and 
Alexandre 2013)  
 
In 2010, the municipal government of Rio began implementing its own set of 
regulations and licensing schemes.  However, like the state regulations, rules are not 
fully obeyed, and there are many more vans operating in the city than are registered.  
The only exception is the “South Zone” of Rio, in which all vans were prohibited after 
                                                
9 Informal “kombis,” or small vans that carry 10-15 passengers, were used to connect 
the favelas to the city center since the early 1980s (Brasileiro 1999). 
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the kidnapping, brutal rape and beating of two foreign tourists who tried to take a van 
from Copacabana to Lapa in April 2013 (BBC Brasil 13 April 2013). 
Another factor that has complicated the issue of how to create an effective urban 
transport system are the political overlaps between the different levels of government.  
Political boundaries of local authorities (municipalities) often do not coincide with the 
functional or economic structure of the metropolitan area.  This creates an environment 
in which city (“prefeitura”) leaders have to plan and finance infrastructure, including 
transportation, in a metropolitan area where local (“municipal”) leaders may have their 
own agendas and infrastructure plan. 
 
Land Use 
“Land use and transport are mutually dependent…  The characteristics of the 
transportation system determine accessibility, or the ease of moving from one 
place to another.  Accessibility in turn affects the location of activities, or the 
land use pattern.  The location of activities in space, together with the 
transportation resources connecting them, affects daily activity patterns, which 
in turn result in travel patterns.  These travel patterns, expressed as flows on the 
transport network, affect the transport system...  [Thus,] a change in land use 
will affect transportation, just as transportation affects land use.”  (Giuliano in 
Hanson 2004, p 239-240)    
If this relationship is not properly planned for, a chaotic situation generated by 
the imbalance between supply and demand can result, causing constant congestion and 
difficulties in the movement of people and goods (Campos 2013). 
Brazilian cities have gone through decades of intense and accelerated 
urbanization, often without planning, which resulted in highly undemocratic, 
fragmented and unsustainable spaces.  The result of this lack of urban planning and 
control over the dynamics of land use and occupation was the development of socially, 
economically and territorially unequal cities.  These cities do not have an adequate 
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distribution of activities or equitable access to public services, job opportunities, 
housing and leisure.  This has caused grave consequences for mobility as a whole, 
especially for people with lower income (Apparicio 2013). 
Because of the horizontal and scattered sprawl of urban land use, distances 
increased and people began to live further and further away from their places of work 
and other essential activities.  Thus, the number and length of trips per capita per day 
has increased.  Several studies of Brazilian cities show that in large urban centers roads 
take, on average, 70% of public space and carry only 20-40% of the population (Vieira 
2013).  This imbalance in spatial configuration allows the emission of tons of pollutants 
into the air and long traffic jams, which reduce the flow of traffic and increase the travel 
time of people; both of these significantly reduces quality of life and the period of rest 
after the work day (Ibid). 
 
The RMRJ today and Urban Mobility Indicators 
The Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (RMRJ) was created in 1974 with 
the merger between the states of Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara and was originally 
composed of 14 municipalities.  Since then, the region has gone through several 
changes before arriving at its current configuration.  As of 2013 the RMRJ consists of 
21 municipalities, which are home to 74.39% of the state's population, or 12,177,231 
inhabitants (CEPERJ 2013).  
19 
 
Figure 6.  "Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro - 2014" 
(CEPERJ 2013) 
 
According to 2012 data from CEPERJ, 77.96% of formal jobs in the state are 
generated in the RMRJ.  Of these, 73.94%  (or 2,572,044 formal jobs) are generated in 
the capital (Rio de Janeiro municipality).  This leaves a huge number of citizens, those 
living in municipalities other than Rio de Janeiro, because they are priced-out of the 
capital due to extremely high real estate prices, who need to make long commutes from 
outlying towns in order to have access to employment in the capital (Ibid).    
The concentration of economic activity in the capital presents numerous 
challenges for public management, not only with regard to urban mobility, but also to 
other areas of social life.  Due to the large number of jobs, study, leisure and shopping 
options, there are flows of people starting from different locations that are all moving 
towards the capital.  These flows must be supplied with efficient and sufficient modes 
of transport that meet the various demands. 
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Growth of the Car and Motorcycle Fleet 
Worsening urban mobility conditions are strongly linked to the choices people 
make about what type of transportation they use and the incentives granted by the 
government to private transport at the expense of public transport.  In this sense, the 
growth in the number of private vehicles is an important indicator to be analyzed. 
The number of cars in the RMRJ reached 3,017,406 units in 2012, an increase of 
almost 80% relative to the number of existing cars in 2001, which was 1,743,553 
units.10  Cars represent approximately 72% of the vehicle fleet in the region (Ribeiro 
2013).  As for the number of motorcycles and scooters, the data are even worse.  In 
2001 the number of motorcycles and scooters in the metropolitan region was 98,209 
units; in 2012 there were 472,591 units, an increase of 377% (Ibid).  
 
                                                
10 Here it should be noted that a large number of vehicles on the road are taxis.  The city 
of Rio, just the capital, has an estimated 33,000 taxis, or 1 taxi for every 190 people.  
However, they are expensive and therefore not a viable option for the daily shifts of 
most of the population (Rangel 2016).  
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Figure 7.  "Automobile Fleet - RMRJ (2001-2012)" 




Figure 8.  "Motorcycle Fleet - RMRJ (2001-2012)" 
(Ribeiro 2013 – data from DELTRAN-RJ) 
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Despite the considerable growth in motorization rates, much of the population of 
the region still does not have a private vehicle.  This implies that the motorization rate 
still has much more potential for growth in the coming years, which would lead to 
worsening conditions of urban mobility and movement.  According to a 2012 PNAD 
report, only 40.9% of households in the state of Rio de Janeiro owned a private vehicle 
(car or motorcycle) (IPEA 2013). 
Due to the growth in income of the poor, and measures that facilitate access to 
credit, the increase in the private vehicle rate was expected.  However, it remains the 
responsibility of the government to develop policies that promote public transportation 
in order to mitigate the negative externalities caused by the rapid and substantial 
increase in the number of private vehicles.  Policies should aim at making public 
transportation more attractive when compared with individual motorized transport. 
 
Home-Work Commute Time 
One of the most studied aspects of urban mobility is the time spent commuting 
between the home and workplace, which is reflected in the wide availability of data on 
the topic.  This is of central concern because the welfare of the citizens is directly 
affected by traffic conditions in the city.  Thus, commute time should be a central theme 
of urban transport policy (Ibid). 
In the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (RMRJ), 1,241,438 people per day 
commute to and from work and/or school in cities other than where they live 
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(IBGE 2012).11 
Datum shows that there is a great disparity in the spatial distribution of schools 
and day care centers between the cities in the metropolitan region.  This causes a large 
proportion of students from the periphery to need to travel to other cities to study.  The 
government pays for students to take public buses to and from school.  The area most 
affected by this in the RMRJ is Mesquita with 25.2% of the population attending school 
or daycare in other cities.  Other municipalities with large numbers of commuting 
students are Tanguá with 16.7%, São João de Meriti with 15.6%, Nilópolis with 15.4%, 
Maricá with 15%, Guapimirim with 14.7%, and Belford Roxo with 14.5%.  This shows 
that different areas of the city have varying access to schools and daycare centers, with 
the capital having the most options. 
                                                
11 All of the following commute times are based on the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra 
de Domicílios (PNAD), conducted by IBGE, which has provided this data annually 
since 1992.   
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Figure 9.  Map of Areas with the Fewest Schools and Daycare Centers in the 
RMRJ 
In the whole of the RMRJ, 1,002,518 people work in municipalities other than 
their municipality of residence.  This means that about 18.8% of all workers in the 
metropolitan region have to travel to other cities in order to work (Ibid).  Regarding job 
opportunities, the city of Rio de Janeiro receives the most residents from other cities 
due to the large concentration of formal jobs, mainly in the center, “Centro.”  65.4% of 
citizens who work outside their municipality of residence work in capital (Machado and 
Mihessen 2013).  Considering only the periphery of the city, the percentage of workers 
with jobs outside their home municipalities jumps to 38.7%.  Considering only the 
Baixada Fluminense, the percentage is 41.4% (IBGE 2012).    
 Looking at individual cities, as opposed to the large areas mentioned above, the 
largest number of workers with jobs in other municipalities are in: Mesquita (60%), 
Japeri (56.1%), Belford Roxo (52.6%), Queimadas (52.2%), Nilópolis (52.1%) and São 
João de Meriti (48.9%).  On the other hand, only 2.5% of Rio de Janeiro residents work 
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outside the municipality (see graph below).  Clearly the concentration of jobs in the 
capital is detrimental to the periphery.   
 
Figure 10.  "Distribution of Employed Workers by Job Location" 
Green- “In their own Home.”  Light Blue- “In their municipality of residence.”  Dark 
Blue- “In a municipality other than the one in which they live.”  
(Observatório Sebrae/RJ 2013) 
 
Looking at only the commutes between peripheral cities and the capital, the 
most affected cities (in number of people) are: Duque de Caxias (118,971), Nova 
Iguaçu (109,611), São João de Meriti (84,247), Niterói (75,325), São Gonçalo (70,124) 
and Belford Roxo (68,468) (IBGE 2012).  This high number of commutes to the capital 
is directly related to the difficulty of securing employment in the periphery and the lack 
of effective public policies and incentives for companies to take a business interest in 
these peripheral cities.  This reinforces the need for more attention be paid to the 
Baixada Fluminense in the development of employment policies and urban mobility, 
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due to the large amount of people who have to travel every day to other cities to get to 
work. 
 Despite large numbers of commuters going into the capital, the largest number 
of daily commuters in the RMRJ is between the cities of Niteroi and São Gonçalo, 
which involves the displacement of 120,329 people per day (IBGE 2015).  This 
suggests policymakers should pay more attention to the mobility conditions between 
these municipalities, which have long been given promises of the construction of a 
metro line, Line 3, which would go under the Guanabara Bay.  However, the project has 
never gotten off the ground. 
Between 1992 and 2012, there was an increase of 7.8% in daily commute times 
in the RMRJ, whose average went from 43.6 minutes to 47 minutes (IPEA 2013).  This 
indicates that the numerous investments in urban mobility over the two decades were 
not effective in reducing or improving commute times.  The most recent IBGE survey 
also shows that residents of the RMRJ lose more time in traffic than in any other 
metropolitan region in Brazil.  
The National Household Survey (PNAD)12 also shows that the proportion of 
people who make long commutes, those lasting more than an hour, increased from 
22.2% to 24.7% in the same period (Ibid). 
According to the 2010 census, this increase especially impacts the people living 
in the Baixada Fluminense, and consequently the poorest population, where 34.7% of 
the population takes more than 60 minutes to get to work.  25.3% of residents of the 
capital take more than one hour (IBGE 2012). 
                                                
12 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) 
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Figure 11.  "Distribution of Employed Workers by the Travel Time to Work - 
Residents of the City of Rio and the Periphery of the RMRJ" 
(Observatório Sebrae/RJ 2013) 
 
When home-work trip times (in minutes) are given for individual cities, the 
residents of Japeri (71), Queimadas (62), Belford Roxo (60), Nova Iguaçu (58) and São 
Gonçalo (52) face the longest trip averages (average trip time in minutes given in 
parenthesis) (Machado and Mihessen 2013). 
In contrast, travel times for the prime areas of the city are much less.  Residents 
of neighborhoods such as Copacabana, Botafogo, Humaitá, Lagoa, Leme, Urca, 
Flamengo, Laranjeiras, and Ipanema take, on average, between 27 and 38 minutes to get 
to work.  In general, workers who take less time to get to work are those who live in the 
pricey “South Zone” or the city center.  The main exception among affluent 
neighborhoods is Barra da Tijuca, whose residents take on average 56 minutes to get to 
work (Machado and Mihessen 2013). 
As for the residents of the neighborhoods Bangu, Santa Cruz, Vila Kennedy, 
Realengo, Sepetiba and Paciencia, the home-work commute takes 56-64 minutes on 
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average (Machado and Mihessen 2013).  This shows that the inefficiency in the spatial 
distribution of jobs is not restricted to the metropolitan level.  It is also, quite sharply, 
within the territorial limits of the capital itself.  This causes the inhabitants of the 
poorest areas to make long journeys to work, since they are far from their place of 
residence.  It is also an indication that the available transport system gives ample 
privilege to prime areas.  These prime neighborhoods are endowed with greater 
transport options, specifically the metro, which is only in the capital.  These options 
also tend to be of higher quality, newer, air conditioned, more frequent, etc.  Thus, it 
can be concluded that the inefficiency of the urban mobility system hampers the poorest 
citizens’ access to the labor market, serving as a vector for social exclusion.   
The recent increase in commute times and the number of people who face these 
long journeys to get to work are associated primarily to the increase in motorization 
rates.  Higher rates of vehicle ownership were driven by economic growth in the region 
and urban spread and the establishment of residential neighborhoods in more remote 
areas, which led to increased distances between the homes and places of work, study 
and public functions.  The large size of the RMRJ and the complexity of the urban 




Table 1.  "Average Home-Work Travel Time of Employed Workers Living in the 
City of Rio" 
(Observatório Sebrae/RJ 2013) 
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Chapter 2: Modes of Transportation 
Between 2003 and 2012 the State Secretary for Transportation conducted 
research called the “Origin and Destination Survey” in which they sought to understand 
how people make their trips depending on the means of transport available to them 
(Relatorio 4 2013).  The table below shows the percentage of daily trips that were made 
via each transportation mode in 2012. 
Transport Mode Number of daily trips (in 
thousands) 
% 
Bus (municipal and 
intermunicipal) 
8,452 37.4 
On Foot 6,634 29.4 
Car 3,765 16.6 
Metro 665 2.9 
Train 568 2.5 
Bicycle 546 2.4 
Motorcycle 170 0.8 
Boat 105 0.5 
Table 2.  Percentage of Daily Trips in the RMRJ Made via Each Mode of 
Transportation 
Table my own.  (Relatorio 4 2013- data from Origem e Destino survey)   
 
Personal Vehicles- Car and Motorcycle  
The production and use of automobiles has increased in recent decades due to 
incentives given by governments to automotive industries, facilitating access to credit 
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and construction of the necessary infrastructure.  Other indirect measures have had a 
great impact on the choice of individual transport are wide freedom of movement and 
very low cost annual licensing (Vasconcellos 2013). 
The most noticeable result of a mobility system that favors the automobile is 
large amount of land occupied by the system of roads.  Estimates suggest that 
infrastructure intended for motorized transport consumes at least 20% of urban land.  
This percentage does even take into account the areas designated for public parking, 
which act as subsidies paid by the entire population to vehicle owners (Vasconcellos 
2014).  Other studies, with more comprehensive definition of what constitutes 
“infrastructure intended for motorized transport” put the percentage of urban land used 
much higher (Duarte, Sanchez and Libardi 2007). 
Arguably, roads are not intended only for cars.  Buses, trucks, and other vehicles 
also use them.  However, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, automobiles occupy 
approximately 74% of roadways, according to research conducted in 1998.  For this 
reason, they are the main focus of the analysis on urban mobility in societies that 
encourage their use as a mode of transport.  The same survey found that a car user takes 
up a space that is about twelve times larger than that of bus users (Vasconcellos 2014). 
Thus, to the extent that the roads occupy a large part of urban territory, the need 
arises to build more and more roads in order to meet the growing number of cars.  This 
is not only an extremely costly and resource intensive process, it also increases 
commute times as the population moves further away from the city center.  In addition, 
the spreading out of cities contributes to lower productivity of public transport since it 
reduces population density.  This means that buses have to travel longer distances and 
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carry fewer people, which increases cost.  The more spread out the city, the higher the 
price of public transport fare (Ibid).  Similarly, access to public transportation becomes 
quite limited in the suburbs, whose residents generally do not have options when it 
comes to what kind of transport they will take. 
As for motorcycles, the main problem is not related to the amount of required 
road space, but with their high rate of accidents (discussed below) and the fact they are 
extremely pollutant.  Emissions per passenger (motorcycle) are almost twice the 
emissions of a car passenger and 32.3 times the emissions of a bus passenger (Silva 
2014).  Therefore, an individual’s attempt to solve his/her mobility problem results in 
costs to be paid by all citizens. 
There is a strong governmental component to the increased use of motorcycles 
in Brazil.  Public officials defend their proliferation without any concern for additional 
safety precautions due to the belief that increased motor vehicle use is necessary for the 
industrialization of the country and that motorized citizens represent societal progress 
(Vasconcellos 2014).  In this context, it is reprehensible that the federal government has 
continued to support, since the 1990s, and their linking the rise of the poorest classes 
with increased motorcycle use.  Silva (2014) adds another component to the discussion, 
political campaign finances.  He argues that the economic and political power of car 
manufacturers come from the ample financial support they give to politicians.  These 
contributions end up being a key factor for political leaders to avoid reducing 
government incentives to private transport, again handicapping public transport. 
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Deaths and Hospitalizations Resulting from Accidents Traffic and Operation Lei Seca 
The number of traffic deaths in the RMRJ has made several swings since 2002.  
In 2002, 1,769 traffic deaths were recorded.  In 2013, the number was down to 1,643 
people, a drop of 7.6% (Rio de Janeiro 2015). 
In the same period, the population of the RMRJ went from 11,195,875 to 
12,177,231 people, an increase of approximately 8.7%.  Therefore, even with this 
relatively high population growth, which was also accompanied by a further growth in 
motorization rates, the number of traffic fatalities had a small decrease (IBGE 2002; 
CEPERJ 2013). 
 Looking at data that links traffic deaths and population growth, the percentage 
drop in death rates is even larger, as would be expected.  In the period 2002-2013, the 
death rate per 100 thousand people in the RMRJ fell from 15.8 to 13.5, down 17%.  
However, only data from the city of Rio de Janeiro contributed to this improvement.  In 
the capital, the death rate dropped from 19.3 to 14.8 per 100 thousand during this 
period.  The periphery and the Baixada Fluminense held steady at 11.9 deaths per 100 
thousand people in both 2002 and 2013, and 9.9 deaths per 100 thousand in 2002 and 10 
deaths per 100 thousand in 2013, respectively (Rio de Janeiro 2015; CEPERJ 2013). 
While the RMRJ saw a decrease in this indicator, data for the country as a whole 
registered an increase in the number of traffic deaths per 100 thousand people between 
2002 and 2012.  The number of deaths increased from 18.7 to 22, an increase of 20.3% 
(IBGE 2002; IBGE 2012). 
In 2009, the first year in which Law 11.705, known as Lei Seca, or dry law, was 
implemented the entire year, 1,343 traffic deaths were recorded in the RMRJ.  This was 
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a 12.3% drop over the previous year (Rio de Janeiro 2015).  However, a direct link 
cannot be made between the adoption of the law and the fall in the number of deaths 
since there was further decrease in the number of deaths in traffic accidents between 
2006 and 2007 (21.5%), and Lei Seca did not exist.  In addition, in 2010, the second full 
year of this law, the number of traffic deaths grew.  1850 people died in traffic deaths 
that year, a increase of almost 38% (Ibid).  
 Despite the rigorous implementation of Operation Lei Seca, which fines and 
suspends the license for one year of those violating the zero tolerance policy in regards 
to drinking and driving, there was no significant reduction in traffic deaths in the RMRJ 
that can be directly linked to the law.  Drivers can choose to opt out of taking a 
breathalyzer, in which case they lose their license for one year (though many continue 
to drive) and must pay a fine of R$ 1,915.40 (Siga Recursos 2013).  The reduction in 
the number of deaths in this period was observed only within the capital, which has the 
highest occurrence of Lei Seca blitzes.  In addition, there are other factors that may 
have contributed to keeping the number of fatal traffic victims from increasing.  
Increased congestion, lower vehicle speeds, better safety standards and features on 
newer vehicles could also have contributed (Monteiro 2014). 
Moreover, the improvement in the data does not necessarily indicate that traffic 
in the RMRJ is safer.  Despite the small decline in death rate per 100 thousand 
inhabitants between 2002 and 2013, the number of hospital admissions due to traffic 
accidents went from 7,417 to 8,016 in the same period, 2002 to 2013 (Rio de Janeiro 
2015). 
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The municipalities of the Baixada Fluminense (except for the municipalities of 
Itaguaí and Seropédica) registered the most rapid growth in the number of hospital 
admissions from traffic accidents.  The municipalities with the most drastic increase 
were Duque de Caxias, where hospital admissions for traffic accidents went from 560 in 
2002 to 733 in 2013; Nova Iguaçu, which went from 146 admissions in 2002 to 840 in 
2013; and São João de Meriti, with 129 admitted in 2002 and 324 in 2013 (Ibid). 
Still, there was a slight improvement in the number of hospitalizations per 100 
thousand inhabitants in the metropolitan region as a whole (66.5 to 65.8).  Again, as 
with the number of deaths, this was due to positive data from the capital, where the 
number of hospitalizations from traffic accidents went from 83.5 to 63.9.  The periphery 
and the Baixada Fluminense had a marked worsening in this regard.  Hospitalizations 
jumped from 46.7 to 68 per 100 thousand in the periphery and from 36.1 to 70.5 per 100 
thousand in the Baixada Fluminense during the period (Ibid).  This indicates that the 
traffic in these regions is more dangerous and that government action has been focused 
on improving only the capital.  More attention from policy makers should be paid to this 
problem in order to develop strategies for combatting it.  
In the case of motorcycles, their proliferation has led to an increase in 
motorcycle related accidents and deaths.  From 2002 to 2013, their share of total 
transport deaths in the RMRJ more than doubled, from 6.6 to 13.3% (Ibid).  Nationally, 
the number of deaths from motorcycle accidents went from 1,421 in 1996 to 14,666 in 
2011, an increase of 932.1%.  The share of traffic accident deaths involving a 
motorcycle represented 4% of the total in 1996 and 33.9% in 2011 (Waiselfisz 2013). 
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Despite the large increase in motorcycle related deaths, pedestrians are still the 
most frequent victims of transport accidents.  Looking at who is most likely to fall 
victim in accidents, in 2013 41% of traffic accident fatalities in the RMRJ were 
pedestrians, which is a drop from 2002.  However, pedestrians remain the main victims 
of traffic accidents, which highlights the need to continue to promote better security 
conditions and safer space in order for this mode of transport to be fully realized, 
especially given the importance of foot transportation to urban mobility. 
 
Figure 12.  Percent of Total Transport Deaths by Mode in the RMRJ, 2002 & 2013 
* Graph my own.  (Rio de Janeiro 2015) 
 
Non-Motorized Modes of Transportation 
Walking 
In Brazil, much human displacement takes place on foot, generally as a 
complement to other modes of transportation.  However, the government has 
Pedestrians Motorcycle 
Occupants 
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systematically underestimated this mode of transport and has not developed public 
policies to improve the quality of pedestrian spaces.  This is evidenced by the 
legislation of most municipalities, which treats the sidewalk differently from other 
components of the road system (Malatesta 2013). 
The construction and maintenance of roads intended for motor vehicles and 
bicycles are the government’s responsibility.  However, the government does not 
regulate sidewalks.  Instead, each resident is responsible for the space located in front of 
his/her house (apartment building, condominium, etc.), which leads to irregularities 
(Silva 2014).  This hampers walking in the city, and for those with difficulties walking, 
or those using wheelchairs, many urban areas become simply impassable.  It must be 
taken into account that accessibility for people with mobility restrictions is not limited 
to the possibility of entering a specific place or vehicle, but extends to the ability to 
move around the city using the various modes of transport system.  The sidewalks are 
the most sensitive point, as every trip either ends and/or begins on them (Duarte, 
Sanchez and Libardi 2007).  Despite official resident responsibility, the government 
should ensure that its citizens have access to walking spaces.  
Malatesta (2013) argues that the legislation dealing with sidewalks provides 
property owners the sense of ownership of the space intended for pedestrians, making 
common the installation of things that impede and discourage walking.  As a result of 
poor quality, narrow, and impeded sidewalks, the number of falls associate with them is 
high.  A study by Gold (2012) pointed out that about 171,000 people fall every year on 
the sidewalks in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (MRSP).  Medical costs and 
social costs of these falls reach the impressive amount of R $ 2.9 billion per year.  
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The lack of appropriate pedestrian spaces, has contributed to the high number of 
pedestrian deaths discussed above.  The most problematic areas in the center and 
northern zone of the city, where there are not enough walkways going over major 
avenues such as Linha Amerela and Avenida Brasil.  Instead of crossing at a raised 
footbridge, or “passarela,” people wait for a break in the traffic to dash to the center 
divider and then to the other side.       
 
Figure 13.  Photos of "Passarelas" 
Linha Amerela (left) and Avenida Brasil (with a motorcycle going across it - right).  
From Observatório de Favelas website and Crônicas dumas Viagens Wordpress. 
 
Bicycling 
The main advantages of the bicycle, which can be used both for transportation 
and leisure, are its low price, low cost of maintenance of, and ease of use.  The bicycle 
also boasts health benefits for its riders and eases environmental and traffic strains put 
on a city by motorized vehicles.  The bicycle is the most used vehicle in the world, with 
a strong presence in developing countries in Asia and even in some developed countries 
like Japan, Germany, the Netherlands and South Korea (Vasconcellos 2012). 
According to the Brazilian Association of Industry, Trade, Import and Export of 
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Bicycles, Parts and Accessories (ABRADIBI)13, there are about 80 million bicycles in 
Brazil.  Despite the large number of bicycles, the bike is not strongly encouraged as a 
means of transport, likely because they are seen as a low-class mode of transportation.  
Bicycle commuting’s major disadvantages are the disregard of drivers and the lack of 
adequate road infrastructure in most cities, a factor that is aggravated by the failure of 
the government to solve this problem (Ibid).  
In order for the bicycle to be adopted effectively as a mode of transportation, it 
must be integrated with other transit modes (Tendencias 2013).  This is done through 
the construction of facilities such as bike racks, and the opening of the metro and buses 
for bicycles.  These measures would allow people to travel part of their daily commute 
by bike (Duarte, Sanchez and Libardi 2007).  However, only 12 metro stations allow 
bicycles to enter and be stored.  At these stations bike can be brought on and off the 
train during off peak hours.  Bikes are not allowed on Metro Buses.  The train system 
has a similar arrangement.  There are specific stations that allow bicycles to be left and 
stored securely during the day.  However, bicycles are only allowed on the trains during 
the weekends.  The most integrated mode of transport for the bicycle is the boat 
between Rio and Niteroi, which allows bicycles to be brought onboard at any time 
without an additional cost.  On the other end of the spectrum is the bus, which does not 
allow bicycles to be brought onboard at any time.  This lack of integration has 
prevented the bike from becoming a real alternative within the urban mobility system, 
causing it to be viewed more as a leisure option.  
                                                
13 Associação Brasileira da Indústria, Comércio, Importação e Exportação de 
Bicicletas, Peças e Acessórios  
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The city has attempted to improve the biking conditions in recent years, 
promising to add 450 kilometers by 2016.  The most impressive of these paths, the Tim 
Maia bike path, runs along the beach and then high above rocky coastline, connecting 
the south zone and the west zone from Leblon to Barra da Tijuca14.  These regions have 
been difficult to access previously because only a busy beachfront road that does not 
have a sidewalk and a tunnel, in which bikes are not allowed, connect them.      
Although the situation is improving for cyclists, there is still a long way to go 
before it is a viable transport option for a large segment of the population.  Older bike 
paths, such as the ones in the neighborhood of Botafogo, can be quite dangerous.  They 
often share sidewalk space with pedestrians and are impeded by trees, posts, and broken 
sidewalks.  Another issue is the lack of regulation of the bike paths.  It is normal for 
cars to be parked in them and for trucks and cars to use them as loading/unloading 
zones for goods and passengers.  Still another issue is the question of security on bike 
paths.  Right after the opening of the Tim Maia bike path, there was a string of assaults 
(Goulart, Ramalho and Ouchana 2016).  Other problem areas include the Aterro do 
Flamengo bike path and the path that crosses through the new tunnel from Botafogo to 
Copacabana.  Both are notorious for bike assaults, the assailants generally wielding 
knives or throwing rocks at the cyclist in order to stop them, rob them and steal their 
                                                
14 On April 21, 21016, only three months after its inauguration, a 50 meter section of 
this new coastal bike path fell into the ocean killing 3 (2 confirmed dead and one 
missing at sea).  This has caused public outcry and opened a new debate on how public 
money for infrastructure projects is being spent and the quality of these projects.  The 
cycle path cost R$ 44 million (G1 21 April 2016).  
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bike.15  These problems have led many more “serious” cyclists to opt for riding in the 
road, which brings its own dangers.  Drivers, particularly taxi and bus drivers, drive 
aggressively and do not pay attention to bikers, whom they consider a nuisance. 
  A paradox of the recent expansion of bike lanes is that they are almost 
exclusively in the wealthier parts of the city.  Yet, it’s the poorest who are most likely to 
bike as a mode of transportation.  Currently, there is no bike path, or safe route, that 




In Brazil, as in other developing countries, buses are the principal mode of 
public transportation.  Their relatively low cost makes and easy implementation give 
them a relative advantage over more expensive and resource intensive systems such as 
trains and subways, despite these systems being more efficient and less polluting 
(Vasconcellos 2012). 
The Brazilian population has always suffered from the poor condition of buses, 
which are uncomfortable, hot, noisy, vibrate aggressively and are often crowded, even 
at none-peak times.  These conditions reflect inefficient management.  Bus companies 
are not even able (or perhaps not motivated) to provide the appropriate number of 
vehicles for times of increased use, especially in relation to buses that serve peripheral 
areas of large cities (Vasconcellos 2014). 
                                                
15 Another example that gained widespread media attention was the brutal stabbing 
death of a cyclist riding on the Lagoa in the early evening in May 2015 (G1 22 May 
2015). 
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The lack of an adequate number of buses combined with the high fare prices, 
which are not reflected in the quality of service, has created a system of disrepute.  
Thus, citizens who can afford it opt for private transport.  This has the effect of 
worsening public transport even more, because with fewer people using it, its 
productivity is decreased, causing an increase in fare price and worsening of mobility 
conditions for the poorest people (Ibid). 
The sharp drop in demand for public buses that has occurred since the mid 
1990s confirms this finding.  The National Association of Public Transport Companies 
(NTU)16 found that bus usage decreased significantly in nine Brazilian capitals 
from1995 to 2013: from an average of 473.7 million passengers per month in these 
cities to 329.8 million passengers (NTU 2014; Maciel 2014).  In order to combat this 
trend, special bus lanes, called Bus Rapid Transit, or BRTs, have been created in hopes 
of improving the quality of bus transport.  These were first implemented in 1974 in 
Curitiba, followed by several others in cities such as Porto Alegre, São Paulo, Manaus, 
Recife and more recently, Rio de Janeiro (Vasconcellos 2014).  
Another issue with public buses is a lack of adequate signaling, directions, and 
maps that allow people inside the vehicle to know where they are.  People waiting at the 
bus stop also lack information on what bus lines will pass and at what time.  This leads 
to widespread confusion and inconvenience for people wishing to take a bus from 
somewhere they are unfamiliar with.  In response, a group in Porto Alegre started an 
initiative called, “Que Ônibus Passa Aqui?”  (Which bus stops here?).  They posted 
stickers on the bus stops and locals collectively wrote down exactly which routes pass 
                                                
16 Associação Nacional das Empresas de Transportes Públicos 
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that stop.  The idea was so popular that it spread to cities around the country, including 
Rio (Steeds 2014). 
As of April 2016, Google Maps now offers real time tracking of some buses and 
the metro, allowing passengers to better estimate when they should leave home and total 
travel time (UOL 11 April 2016).  However, Google has so far not been able to keep up 
with the changing bus routes, ever-increasing fares, and other interruptions or changes 
in traffic.17  This has created a space for entrepreneurial innovation.  A new phone 
application has just been launched in Rio to try to fill this gap.  The app “Without Car” 
(Sem Carro) uses geolocalization to map out the best routes for those circulating the 
city without a car (O Globo 25 April 2016).   
 
Buses- the New System 
In 2010, in response to the urban mobility crisis, highlighted by the added 
pressure and demand put on the city’s transport system by the upcoming mega-events 
(principally the World Cup and 2016 Olympics), the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo 
Paes, introduced a new model for the bus system.  The new model would open bids, not 
for single or isolated lines as had been done in the past, but the system as a whole.  The 
city would be split into five major “regional transportation networks,” to be operated by 
four major consortia.   
For the first 100 years of bus service in Rio, the system was managed in a 
chaotic, individual manner, with the city granting individual routes to companies in the 
                                                
17 For example, some roads change the flow direction of traffic during peak time.  
Google Map routes, especially those dealing with public transportation, are not reliable, 
and their suggested bike routes can be utterly dangerous.  
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form of permissions.  Additionally, the structural network of lines was old and not 
befitting the current demands of the citizenry.  For these reasons, as well as the high 
cost of taking the bus, alternative transportation (vans and kombis) became more 
widespread throughout the city.  The fact that lines were managed individually also led 
to predatory competition between the companies.  There were often duplicate lines 
running on the most profitable routes, creating an excess in some areas and a shortage 
of buses in other, less profitable areas.  Beyond being chaotic, the structure of the 
system at the time gave to city little power to intervene on the companies' operation.  
Nor did the permissions have clear quality standards, which led uneven coverage and 
low quality of service.  To address these issues, there was a complete redesign of the 
bus system in 2010.  The 45 companies operating the thousands of buses in the city in 
2010 would be replaced by a system that divided the city into 5 regions, operated by 4 
consortia.  
In the new system, companies would have to meet specific requirements in order 
to operate.  For example, in the south zone there was an excess of lines and fleets.  
There was predatory competition, which led to many routes being duplicated.  There 
were also concerns about the quality of the service and waiting times, especially during 
low demand hours.  The new system would also try to reduce distances between stops.  
Each company had to submit a project proposal outlining how they would manage the 
region.  The winners would have until the beginning of 2016 to reformulate the routes 
and update their fleets (Rio Onibus 2013). 
In 2010 the city opened the bidding for four of the five regions.  In order to bid 
on the operation of a region, companies had to meet a long list of requirements.  As 
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many individual companies could not meet the financial and technical conditions set by 
the city, they were allowed to form consortia.  However, only one company has the 
legal control over the whole region.  Bidding companies had to have been in operation 
for at least five years prior to the bid and have an operating fleet of at least 1000 
vehicles per day.  Additionally, companies had to agree to regulations dealing with: fuel 
and environmental standards; security- installing GPS and cameras in every bus; 
accessibility- adapting all buses and terminals to meet accessibility standards; use of the 
single ticket system, “Bilhete Unico;” training for all drivers and “cobradores”18 (Ibid). 
In the end, only 8 of the 41 one companies who submitted bids followed the 
rules correctly, drawing criticism for the complexity of the bidding process.  Others 
complained of possible collusion among companies and an investigation was opened by 
the prosecutor's office.  However, the process was allowed to continue and the four 
consortia were chosen, each winning a 20-year concession contract (Magalhaes 2012). 
The city in now divided into 5 major regions of operation, 4 of which are 
operated by private consortia and 1 that is considered “common use.”  The first area of 
operation includes the downtown (“Centro”) and the port areas.  This region was not 
auctioned off and is considered common use, as a destination for all other regions.  The 
operation of internal bus lines in this region was given to INTERSUL, who also 
operates region 2.  The second region includes all of the “South Zone” (Zona Sul), 
Santa Teresa, and Tijuca.  Region 3 is operated by Internorte and encompasses all of the 
“North Zone” (Zona Norte).  Region 4 is operated by the Transcarioca consortium and 
                                                
18 “Cobradores” are the person who takes the fare money and unlocks the turnstile on 
the bus.  
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includes Barra da Tijuca, Recreio, and Jacarepagua.  The fifth region encompasses other 
neighborhoods in the “West Zone” (Zona Oeste) and it operated by Santa Cruz. 
 
Figure 14.  Map of "the Division of the City" 
(Rio Onibus 2013) 
 
Until the middle of 2015, combining all regions, there were 703 lines in 
operation, accounting for about 16 million trips traveling a distance of more than 700 
million kilometers per year.  The bus fleet consists of 19,000 buses with average bus 
age of 3.5 years.  More than two-thirds of public transport trips in the city were made 
via bus. 
Since mid-2015, the system has again undergone huge changes, as the plans 
from 2010 are finally being implemented throughout the city.  As changes are still 
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ongoing, it is not possible to comprehensively evaluate the impacts of the new system.  
However, initial reactions have been mixed. 
Although fleets are in the process of being updated, many buses are still without 
air conditioning and functioning wheelchair lifts.  As of the beginning of this year, only 
70% of buses in the city of Rio were air conditioned (Goulart 2016).  
Another common complaint is the payment system.  Older buses had a 
“cobrador” to receive cash payments.  Newer buses have eliminated this person, forcing 
the bus driver to be responsible not only for driving, but also for taking cash payments 
and unlocking the turnstile.  This downsizing has had a negative effect on the drivers, 
who now have more responsibilities, as well as decreased the quality of service.  It has 
slowed service since the driver cannot begin driving until after he or she takes the cash 
payments and makes change.  The idea was to incentivize more people to use prepaid 
cards.  Prepaid cards are only available to purchase and reload at a few locations around 
the city, making them an unlikely option for tourists or the casual (i.e. infrequent) bus 
rider.   
However, the principal complaint is about the new routes and the cutting tens of 
lines.  The new route map called for extensive line cuts, especially in the south zone.  
Although this has helped to alleviate some traffic congestion, it has led to longer wait 
times, overcrowding, and the need to make more bus changes (Raiter 2015).  Many of 
the lines coming from the northern suburbs into the south zone were gotten rid of, 
forcing people to first go to Central station in downtown and then change to a bus 
serving the south zone.  Coming from the west zone, riders must go to Rio Sul shopping 
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center in Botafogo, and then catch another bus to reach other south zone neighborhoods 
or "Centro.”  This necessitates more connections and thus longer total travel times.   
Another concern with more connections is with payment.  As of now, the single 
ticket system, "Bilhete Unico," allows for one bus change within two hours at no 
additional cost.  If a person now needs to makes two or more connections in order to 
arrive at their destination, this is an additional cost to the user for a service that is 
already expensive. 
 
Figure 15.  "Bilhete Unico" Card 
From Bilhete Unico website. 
 
Metro 
With respect to rail transportation (train and metro), the greatest challenge to 
creating a large network is the associate cost and resources required, especially when 
the construction is underground.  Costs can vary greatly depending on the geological 
characteristics of the soil, if it is necessary to evict residents, and other factors that can 
increase the budget (Silva 2014). 
Just for comparison, the 16 kilometers of Rio de Janeiro’s Metro Line 4 are 
estimated to cost R$ 8.5 billion, or about R$ 531 million per kilometer.  The BRT (bus 
rapid transit) Transoeste exclusive bus corridor connecting Santa Cruz/Campo Grande 
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to Barra da Tijuca (Jardim Oceânico) will stretch 58 kilometers, at a total estimated cost 
of R$ 1 billion.  In this case, the cost per kilometer of BRT will be approximately 32 
times lower than the cost per kilometer of metro (Magalhaes 2012; Rio de Janeiro 
2014).  Both are scheduled to be completed by the start of the Olympics in 2016. 
When the estimated passenger demand is taken into account for both the Metro 
Line 4 and the BRT Transoeste, the difference is even more evident.  The Metro line 4 
is expected to serve 300,000 users per day; the BRT Transoeste forecasts 230,000 
passengers per day.  So, there was an investment of R$ 29,333 for each passenger per 
day taking the Metro Line 4 between Barra da Tijuca and Ipanema, and only an R$ 
4,347 investment per daily passenger of the BRT Transoeste route (Rio de Janeiro 2014; 
Rio Onibus 2013).  This shows the privileged status granted by the government to the 
richest areas of the city, which are provided with the fastest and most comfortable 
means of transportation. 
In addition to the huge costs involved, it is important to emphasize that the mere 
construction of subway lines is not sufficient to decongest the traffic of a city and 
reduce or stop the economic losses from traffic jams.  It takes a number of other 
measures to discourage people to use individual transport (Silva 2014). 
Today the Metro has 35 stations in operation, distributed over 2 lines and 35 
kilometers (21.75 miles) of track (note that Central-Botafogo path is shared by both 
Lines 1 and 2, this stretch was counted only once in measurement of kilometers)19.  The 
                                                
19 The Rio de Janeiro metro was inaugurated on March 5, 1979, by then 
governor Faria Lima.  It consisted of only 4.3 kilometers of track and 5 stations near the 
city center (Gloria, Cinelândia, Presidente Vargas, Central, Praça Onze).  There were 4, 
4-car trains, which circulated every 8 minutes between the hours of 9:00am and 
3:00pm.  Still, it carried an average of 60,000 people a day in the first 10 days, or over 
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Metro serves 460,000 people a day.  In comparison, the New York City subway system 
has 422 stations, 375 kilometers of track (233 miles), and carries, on average, 5.6 
million riders every weekday (MTA website).   
                                                                                                                                          
500,000 total passengers (Metro Rio "Historia").  The station with the most traffic was 
Cinelândia, with more than one third of all passengers entering or exiting at the stop.   
 In December, the hours of operation were extended to 11:00pm, and the 
following year, two more stations were added, Uruguaiana and Estacio.  The same year, 
1980, the four trains each added two additional cars, for a total of 6 cars each.  
 In January 1981, the Carioca station opened. Catete, Largo do Machado, 
Flamengo, and Botafogo would go on to be opened later in the year, completing the 
southern portion of Line 1.  In 1982, the northern portion of Line 1 was completed with 
the opening of Alfonso Pena, São Francisco Xavier, and Saens Pena.  Line 1 would not 
see another addition until more than 15 years later.  In 1998 the Cardeal Arcoverde 
station opened, linking Copacabana to the system.  In 2003, the second station in 
Copacabana, Siqueira Campos, opened, and a “Surface Metro” (Metro Bus) was added 
to connect the station to Leblon and Barra (The “surface metro” does not have an 
additional cost- is included in the price of the metro fare).  In February of 2007 the final 
stop in Copacabana, Cantagalo, was inaugurated.  The same year, a “Surface Metro” 
was added that connected the Botafogo station with the Gavea neighborhood.  In 
December 2009, General Osório was opened, linking the Ipanema to the system.  The 
“Surface Metro” to Leblon and Barra were moved to General Osório as well.  Since 
2009, no new stations have been added to Line 1, although 5 stations are currently 
under construction.  The five additional stations have been under construction since 
2010 and will be called Line 4.      
In November 1981, Line 2 was inaugurated with the opening of the São 
Cristovão and Maracanã stations.  There was also a free bus that connected São 
Cristovão (Line 2) to the Estacio station (Line 1).  In 1983, the Maria da Graça, Del 
Castilho (Cidade Nova), Inhaúma, and Irajá stops were added to Line 2.  In 1988, the 
Triagem stop was added, followed by Engenho da Rainha in 1991.  After five years of 
no additional stations, two new stations opened in 1996, Tomas Coelho and Vicente de 
Carvalho.  In 1998, the northern section of Line 2 was completed with the reopening of 
Irajá (closed in 1985 due to an accident) and the opening of Colégio, Coelho Neto, 
Acari-Fazenda Botafogo, Engenheiro Rubens Paiva, and Pavuna.  In 2009 Line 2 was 
connected to Line 1 via the Central station, eliminating the need to take a bus transfer 
between the two lines.  In 2014, Uruguai station was opened, the northern most stop on 
the line.  
In 2005, the “Integrated Express” system was inaugurated, which added 12 
Metro bus lines leaving from various stations and serving nearby neighborhoods (not 
covered by the Metro itself).  Neighborhoods served by these special lines are: Urca, 
São Cristovão, Caju, Cosme Velho, Vila Isabel, Andaraí, Usina, Grajaú, and Cidade 




Figure 16.  Map of the Metro Rio System 
From Metro Rio website. 
 
As can be seen in the map above, Rio’s metro system resembles more of a ‘Y’ 
than a true network, where various parts of the city would be connected to the center via 
different lines.  This will only worsen with the opening of Line 4, which is in reality just 
a western extension of Line 1 (connecting Ipanema/General Osório to Barra - see map 
below).  This design has led to inefficiencies and long wait times between trains.  
52 
Originally Line 4, which was first bid for in 1998, would run from Barra da 
Tijuca to Botafogo via Gavea and Jardim Botanico.  Due to lack of funding the project 
remained shelved until 2004, when the municipality of Rio de Janeiro decided to pay 
for its construction (and would then sell it operation and maintenance to a private 
company).  The city likely decided to pay for the project because by this time Rio had 
already been chosen to host the 2007 Pan American Games.  Despite renewed interest, 
the line’s construction never got underway, and the project was again abandoned.  
In 2010, after winning the bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games (announcement 
was made October 2, 2009), the city again returned to the Metro Line 4 project.  This 
time the city modified the projected route to connect Barra da Tijuca to Ipanema via 
São Conrado and Leblon, instead of running through Gavea and Jardim Botanico.  
 
Figure 17.  Map of the Metro Rio Line 4 
“Localization of Stations on Line 4 of the Metro Rio, New lines will connect Ipanema 
to Barra da Tijuca and there will be 6 stations.”  
From Metro Rio website. 
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As of March 2016, the new line is slated to open for operation by July 2016, just 
in time for the Olympic Games.  So far, none of the six new stations have opened, and 
there is skepticism over whether or not it will be finished in time given all of the delays 
up until now.  As of March 2016, there are still 150m to be dug and 3 kilometers of 
track to be laid (G1 8 March 2016).  
Despite the slow expansion and poor network/coverage of the Metro, it remains 
one of the better modes of public transportation.  The quality of subway cars and 
accessibility outperforms other modes offered in the city.  However, this comes at a 
price.  On April 2, 2016, the metro raised its price, bringing a single ticket to R$ 4.10, 
making it the second highest transport fare in the city.  Even still, it is prone to delays 
and extreme overcrowding, especially during peak times.  
 
Train 
In 1998 the train system in Rio de Janeiro was privatized, with new management 
going to SuperVia.  SuperVia won a 25-year concession, but in 2010, after only 12 
years, Governor Sergio Cabral granted a new 25-year concession to the company 
(SuperVia “Historia”).   
The Rio de Janeiro train system is made up of five different lines, running 
through 12 municipalities.  It has over 270 kilometers of track and 98 stations, passing 
through almost all the cities in the Baixada Fluminense (except Seropédica and Itaguaí).  
Four train stations are integrated with the Metro system and the Bonsucesso stop is 
connected to the Complexo de Alemão cable car.  The current fleet is made up of 160 
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trains, and 95% of all trips are made on trains with air-conditioning.  SuperVia has said 
that all trains will have air-conditioning by July 2016 (O Dia 26 February 2016). 
In 2009, the state government purchased 30 new trains, and in 2012, the 
government secured the purchase of an additional 70 trains.  The final 10 trains of the 
2012 purchase are in the testing phase now and will be in operation by the Olympics.  
This will allow for the removal of the last old, steel trains.  This purchase helped 
modernize the fleet, bringing the average train age from 35 to 16 years old.  There are 
an additional 12 trains that will be delivered in the next 18 months (Ibid).       
Despite recent investments, overall quality of the train system remains poor.  
Considering the number of municipalities served by the rail system and the length of its 
track, the train system could be an excellent way to reach the city center from the 
periphery if it were not for the poor quality of service.  There are not enough trains 
circulating, which lead to overcrowding.  The trains that are circulating are 
uncomfortable, slow, prone to delays, and often break down due to poor maintenance.    
SuperVia had stated the goal of carrying 1 million passengers per working day 
by 2015.  Yet, in 2014 the average was only 620,000 passengers (SuperVia website).  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the last year that the operation of the train 
system was in the hands of the state (1998), the average number of passengers per day 
was only 176,132 (MacDowell 2011).   
Since SuperVia started managing the system, there was a groundswell of 
demand.  Even still, growth could have been much higher given the extent of the 
railway lines, the population density of the affected cities, and the large amount of 
commuting that the residents of these cities undertake.  For comparison, the 
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metropolitan train of São Paulo, which has six lines totaling 260 km and 98 stations 
distributed over 22 cities, carried an average of 2.8 million riders per working day in 
2014 (CPTM 2015).   
The primary deterrent to taking the train for most citizens is the low quality of 
the offered service: long wait times between trains, old, low-quality cars, frequent 
delays, lack of air-conditioning and overcrowding, among other complaints 
(MacDowell 2011).  When people are faced with the choice of taking a private car (if 
they have one) or low-quality public transport, it is less likely they opt to travel by 
public transport.  Thus, SuperVia not hitting their own goal in ridership is partly due to 
their own actions, or lack there of. 
Of the more than 500,000 passengers per day, most are members of "classe c" 
(from IBOPE 2010 on SuperVia website).  According to a 2010 study, only 2% of train 
passengers are from the highest earning class, "classe A.”  34% of users are from 
"classe B," and 59% of users are from "classe C."  The ridership could explain the lack 
of investment when compared to the Metro.  Despite carrying more people and having a 
much greater reach, the train system has not seen the amount of investment as the Metro 
system.  In Rio, there is a clear priority to expand public transportation in the areas of 
the city where people already have plentiful transportation options and give priority to 
individual transport.  
 
Boats 
 In 1998 the boat system, consisting of three routes (Niteroi-Rio, Paquetá-Rio, 
Ribeira/Ilha do Governador-Rio) was privatized, with the concession going to Barcas 
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S.A.  After the privatization began a process of restoration and modernization of the 
fleet as well as the stations.  One year later, the service that used to have only 3 boats 
started to operate with 8.  In 2004, a new line was opened, running from Charitas to Rio 
(Praça XV).   
In 2006, the system underwent several changes.  The boat terminal on Ilha do 
Governador was changed to Cocotá, a more strategic area located at the center of the 
island and better integrated with the bus network.  Another major change was on the 
Niteroi-Rio line.  The state government purchased the first two catamarans, decreasing 
travel time because the catamarans do not have to turn around.  The following years the 
fleet continued to be updated and an Operational Control Center Centro was opened.  
The Operation Center gives real time departure and arrival information, location, speed, 
and number of passengers onboard.   
Today, the boat system in operated by CCR Group, which took over in 2012.  
Split among the four routes, there are 24 boats (6 large catamarans, 9 smaller 
catamarans, and 9 traditional boats).  29 million people are transported each year, with 
an average of 10,000 passengers per hour during peak times (SSA Barcas website).20   
Although service has improved, many complain that the fare is too high when 
compared to the service rendered.  Today, a single ticket costs R$ 5.60.  Lines and wait 
times can be long during peak times, and it is not uncommon for boats to be delayed.  
Boats are overcrowded causing people to have to sit on the stairs, which is against 
safety regulations.  On the principal line, which in Niteroi-Praça XV, only two boats 
have air conditioning.  Of the five terminals, 3 have air-conditioning (Charitas- 2004, 
                                                
20 http://www.grupoccr.com.br/barcas/sobre-a-ccr-barcas 
57 
Praça XV and Niteroi- 2014, Cocotá and Paquetá- no AC).  Additionally, a new line 
that would connect São Gonçalo to Praça XV, which represents 40% of the passengers 
that make the trip from Niteroi to Praça XV, has been discussed since 2009 (Palmares 
2013).  However, it has never gone beyond the planning stages.  Again, projects that 
would serve poorer areas of the city, with the longest commutes to downtown Rio de 
Janeiro, have been set aside.    
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Chapter 3: Social Impacts of Urban Mobility 
Urban Mobility and Social Exclusion 
 Now that we have discussed the configuration of the Metropolitan Region of Rio 
de Janeiro and the modes of transportation used within it, we can look the social 
impacts of the transportation system discussed in Chapter 2.  
Urban mobility is not only "the ability of individuals to move from one place to 
another within the cities" (Tagore Et al. 1995 in Cardoso 2008).  Though it is related to 
the daily shifts (travel) of the population in urban space – not only its effective 
occurrence, but also the ease of occurrence of these trips is important (Cardoso 2008).  
Taking this into account, Gomide (2006) defines urban mobility as the "ease of 
movement of people and goods in the city, in view of the complexity of economic and 
social activities it involved.”  In this sense, the poor, elderly or people with physical 
limitations are only able to access inferior levels of mobility in relation to the higher 
income classes and those without physical impediments or disabilities (Vasconcellos 
2001).  This leads groups of people to be excluded from the activities of society and 
acts as an obstacle to social development and the rise of urban welfare (SUMMA 2005). 
When urban mobility is used as a social inclusion strategy, it should enhance 
citizens' access to services offered.  But, what is true in metropolitan areas is that the 
poor conditions of urban mobility, particularly with regard to the provision of public 
transport, has been a factor that intensifies the process of social exclusion (Machado 
2010). 
Several indicators can be studied to assess the social impacts of the transport 
system in order to evaluate whether it is exclusionary or if it contributes to social 
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inclusion.  These indicators include: the access to basic services and employment for 
people who do not own cars, the affordability of tariffs for the lowest income segment 
of the population - in general, spending on transport should not exceed 20% of the 
family budget, and the accessibility of the system for people with disabilities (Ibid). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, access to basic services is a real issue 
faced by the RMRJ due to the high concentration of services in the capital.  This makes 
it more difficult, time consuming and costly for those living far away to take advantage 
of these services. 
The same is true in the case of employment.  According to Pereira and 
Schwanen (2013), the time spent by people in their movements should be of central 
interest to urban and transport policies since congestion levels have strong impact 
people's quality of life.  In this aspect, the RMRJ has the worst rating in Brazil, with a 
50 minute average commute time between home and work (FGV 2014).  The number of 
workers who make long journeys to get to work has increased considerably, and several 
factors have been listed as contributors to this situation.  Factors include population 
growth, increased motorization rates, and increased congestion levels (Pereira and 
Schwanen 2013). 
 Even worse, "the poor and inadequate forms of displacement carried out by an 
inefficient mobility system would produce effects contrary to income gains made by 
workers in the current situation of employment generation" (Ribeiro and Ribeiro 2013, 
p. 9).  The concentration of labor supply in the central areas of large urban centers and 
the growth of the population living in distant suburbs have been the main points of 
impact in terms of displacement to access of employment and income.  This is further 
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aggravated by the poor quality and even abandonment of the mass transit system, 
increasing the time spent by residents in their daily commutes, and directly reflected in 
their perception of urban welfare (Ribeiro and Ribeiro 2013). 
According to Machado (2010), the equity of access and adequate transportation 
are key to social inclusion and to progress towards sustainability.  It is noteworthy that 
the price of transportation has a significant impact on the low-income population and 
can be a decisive factor in spatial segregation.  Those who cannot afford the fare are 
trapped in the periphery, unable to take part in the society of the city. 
 Considering the third indicator listed by Machado, the accessibility of the 
system for people with disabilities, we turn to a more in depth examination below.   
 
Transportation and Accessibility 
2010 census data show that 2,973,367 citizens in the Metropolitan Region of Rio 
de Janeiro have some kind of disability (visual, auditory, physical/motor, 
mental/intellectual), representing approximately 24.9% of the residents of this region.21   
Of these, 924,149 people, or 7.7% of the population, have a motor disability or some 
limited mobility (IBGE 2012).  This represents a major challenge for public sector 
decision makers, as it means that a large number of people need public facilities to be 
adapted in some way in order for them to have access.  Measures to ensure accessibility 
for people with disabilities are also useful and necessary for the elderly population and 
people with temporarily reduced mobility.  However, despite the significant number of 
                                                
21 This is in line with the national average, which was 23.9% according to the 2010 
Census (G1 27 April 2012). 
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citizens with disabilities, public transportation options available in the RMRJ are far 
from meeting this demand. 
The omission with respect to these citizens is historical.  The 1988 Constitution 
established the requirement that public transportation vehicles must be able to 
adequately serve people with disabilities.  Article 227 is explicit in this sense.  It says 
"the law shall regulate construction standards for public sites, buildings of public use 
and manufacture of public transport vehicles in order to ensure adequate access for the 
disabled" (Brazil 1988).  Additionally, Article 244 states that the public transport 
vehicles already in use should be adapted (Ibid). 
However, neglect has prevailed.  The law mentioned in the Constitution, known 
as the City Statute, which guarantees accessibility to public transit, was approved only 
12 years after the new Constitution, in 2001.22  Even then, a presidential decree was 
necessary in order to regulate the law (Brazil 2000).  In 2004, Decree No. 5296 was 
finally introduced, which established that within 10 years the fleet of public transport 
vehicles and infrastructure services must be fully accessible (Brazil 2004). 
Accessibility, as defined in the law and in the subsequent decree, is not 
restricted to only the necessary changes in public transport vehicles, but also to the 
public transit infrastructure as a whole, such as passenger terminals, stations, bus stops, 
and sidewalks.  When looking at the current situation, 12 years after the decree and 28 
                                                
22 “Despite the constitutional and legal provisions being truly innovative frameworks 
and there being timid and isolated experiences of implementing the City Statute’s 
instruments, the effectiveness of its normative premises is a completely different reality.  
In general, the Statute’s instruments and tools are rarely applied by the municipal 
governments and by the Judiciary” (Junior, Zarate and Emanuelli 2014, p. 14). 
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years after the new Constitution, it is clear that the government is not giving the 
necessary priority to the issue.  
 
Accessibility of Each Public Transport Mode 
Looking first at the bus system, the most used mode of public transportation, gives a 
good sense of the situation in the city as a whole – long grace periods to update fleets, 
underwhelming results and lack of penalization or other consequences.  Despite the 
ample time given, bus companies have still not met the law’s requirements regarding 
accessibility.  In the city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, 76% of buses were adapted in 
2014.  In the same year, both Rio Onibus, the bus union that represents the companies 
operating the bus system in the city, and the Municipal Transport Secretary do Rio de 
Janeiro ensured the public that the entire fleet and all necessary equipment would be 
accessible by 2015 (G1 12 February 2014).  In 2015, the union pushed the date back to 
March 2016, but so far this promise has still not been delivered (Rio Onibus 2015).  
And yet, there is no signal from the regulatory authorities that they will punish the city 
bus companies. 
The Municipal Transport Secretary, responsible for overseeing that the 
companies are in compliance with the law, customarily lengthens the time limits for 
compliance with the law rather than punish companies that even after more than a 
decade since the legislation, insist on disrespecting rights of persons with disabilities.  
Decree 5296 and Article 46 clearly state that the supervision and the imposition of fines 




The syndicate of bus companies operating in Duque de Caxias, Magé and 
Guapimirim, called Setransduc, and the syndicate that operates in Nova Iguaçu, Belford 
Roxo, Mesquita, São João de Meriti and Nilopolis, called TransOnibus, do not have any 
information about the accessibility of vehicles in their fleets.23  The responsibility for 
supervision of these companies, when they act only at the municipal level, is the 
executive power of each of these municipalities. 
As for the bus companies that are used on intercity routes, their supervision is 
the responsibility of the State of Rio de Janeiro Department of Road Transport, or 
DETRO,24 which is the state government’s organ responsible for monitoring and 
regulating the provision of this service.  DETRO has demonstrated its willingness to act 
much more so than the municipal inspectors.  In 2015, DETRO fined intercity regular 
fleet buses 1,843 times and removed 700 buses from circulation.  Reasons for removing 
buses included failing to meet accessibility requirements (DETRO 2015b). 
However, it should be noted that DETRO is quite limited since the intercity bus 
fleet is comprised of a total of only 6,506 vehicles.  The entire fleet of vehicles in the 
RMRJ is comprised of 20,032 vehicles (FETRANSPOR 2015).  Thus, if the organs 
responsible for the municipalities in the metropolitan region fail to perform their 
supervisory role, meeting the accessibility requirements in the whole of the RMRJ is 
unlikely. 
The SETRERJ union of bus companies, which serves Itaboraí, Maricá, São 
Gonçalo, Tanguá and Niterói, says that their entire fleet complies with the accessibility 
                                                
23 There is no information on either the Setransduc or TransOnibus website. 
24 Departamento de Transportes Rodoviários do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
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standards defined by federal law (SETRERJ website).  However, this information is not 
consistent with reality.  In April 2015, DETRO inspected the Viação Mauá garage in 
São Gonçalo (operated by SETRERJ) and found 23 buses with irregularities, mainly 
related to their overall state of repair and the platform lifts for wheelchairs (DETRO 
2015; O Globo 24 April 2015).  Another issue raised by the inspectors is that even 
companies that have already adapted to the accessibility requirements have difficulties 
in operating the equipment.  If a bus has a wheelchair accessible door and lift, but the 
driver has not received training to properly operate it, it is of no good for those people 
needing it.  There is often also a lack of respect from drivers, many of whom will 
choose not to stop for people in wheelchairs even when the bus is equipped.   
Bus companies operating in other cities of the metropolitan region do not 
provide any information of the accessibility of their fleets.  
Turning to rail and water transport, the regulatory agency responsible for the 
oversight of the boat, metro and train transport systems is AGETRANSP – the State of 
Rio de Janeiro Regulatory Agency of Publicly Conceded Services for Water, Train, 
Metro and Road Transport.25   It was established by the state government in 2005 in the 
form of special authority and is responsible for defending the rights of users and 
correcting problems in the provision of services (AGETRANSP website). 
AGETRANSP has the authority to fine companies, or consortia of companies, 
that do not respect the rules regarding accessibility.  However, not a single fine has been 
imposed for infringing these rules, even when the violations are visible in all modes of 
transport monitored by the agency.  The agency has already fined several companies for 
                                                
25 Agência Reguladora dos Serviços Públicos Concedidos de Transportes Aquaviários, 
Ferroviários e Metroviários e de Rodovias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
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various compliance problems, but never for accessibility-related issues.  This has led to 
varying degrees of compliance among the three modes of transport it oversees, the train 
and the boat systems being the worst and the Metro being considerably better. 
 SuperVia has been responsible for operating the train service in the RMRJ since 
1998.  SuperVia gives no information or indication of the number of stations that 
already meet accessibility standards.  It only reports that it will invest R$ 376 million so 
that all 102 stations that they operate are in line with “international standards of 
accessibility” (SuperVia website).  However, these works will only be completed in 
2020 (projected), a blatant disregard for the law, with nothing being done to punish it. 
Meanwhile, people with disabilities who use the transport system have had to 
rely on the goodwill of others to be able to assert their right to come and go. 
 
Figure 18.  Photo of a Wheelchair User Being Carried Down Stairs 
Photo taken at Realengo train station.  From Turismo Adaptado Wordpress. 
Water transport (ferries that operate between Niteroi and Rio de Janeiro) is the 
responsibility of CCR Barcas, which took control of Barcas S/A in 2012.  Their 
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concession started in 1998 and has a term of 25 years, extendable for another 25 years.  
As of today, the company has not fully adapted any of its five stations to meet 
accessibility standards (CCR website).  In May 2015, the deputy director of the ALERJ 
Commission for Persons with Disabilities, Tania Rodrigues, who is a wheelchair user, 
said that there are other problems such as lack of staff training, the height of the ticket 
counter, lack of space specifically for wheelchairs and the absence of lifejackets within 
easy access of wheelchair users.  "They do not provide the infrastructure for wheelchair 
users to exercise the right to come and go independently."  In response, CCR Barcas 
committed to "developing working groups in order to improve the adaptation of spaces, 
fully eliminating all types of obstacles” (O Dia 28 May 2015).  
However, the deadline for compliance with the accessibility requirements of 
water transport, unlike the deadlines of other modes of transport, according to Decree 
5,296 (2004) and Administrative Order 232 (2008), ended in December 2012 
(INMETRO 2008). 
As a result of not meeting the deadline, in June 2014 the prosecutor’s office26 
filed a Civil Public Action for the Obligation to Comply,27 which requires the justice to 
oblige CCR Barcas to comply with the current legislation (MPRJ 2014). 
 It should be noted that it was necessary to go to extremes, to bring the issue 
before the justice to be decided.  AGETRANSP, the agency specifically created by the 
state government to monitor these issues, should have acted.  Instead, the Prosecutor’s 
Office had to intervene in order for the rights of persons with disabilities or reduced 
mobility to be respected. 
                                                
26 Ministerio Publico 
27 Ação Civil Pública para Cumprimento da Obrigação de Fazer 
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 On the other end of the spectrum is the Metro, which far from being perfect has 
at least made real efforts to improve accessibility throughout the system.  MetroRio, the 
company that has managed and operated the subway lines since 1998, assumed the 
accessibility commitment in 2007, when its contract was renewed until 2038.  MetroRio 
committed itself to develop and implement an accessibility project in each station 
(INVEPAR 2011).  In February 2010, the former director of institutional relations for 
MetroRio, Joubert Flores, said that all stations would meet the conditions of 
accessibility by the end of the year (ALERJ 2010).  Five years later, MetroRio claims to 
be 100% wheelchair accessible buts its users are still finding it difficult to navigate.  In 
December 2015 a woman got stuck in the Carioca station and needed assistance to 
leave, an occurrence she says has happened to her several times (G1 4 December 2015).  
Laura Martins, of the website “Cadeira Voadora,” writes that the subway is not a great 
option because in general it is complex and a long way to the boarding area.28  
Furthermore, the gap between the platform and the train, which can be higher or lower 
depending on the station, makes loading and unloading an adventure.  What is more, 
she says, is that there is not always a suitable location for positioning the wheelchair, 
which can be a factor that represents accident risk (Martins 2016). 
One positive aspect of MetroRio, when compared to other public transport 
operators, is that it is more transparent in providing information about the accessibility 
of each station, which can be found on its website.29   
                                                
28 The General Osório station, for example, requires three separate small elevators be 
taken, on top of a long distance, just to reach the tracks, and it is the newest station in 
the whole system.  Other stations have a series of basic wheelchair lifts that run along 
the stairway handrails.  
29 https://www.metrorio.com.br/Facilidade/Acessibilidade 
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Although the Metro outperforms other modes of transportation in regards to 
accessibility, it has one of the most expensive fares and only operates in the capital, 
where average household incomes are higher.  Yet, there is a strong link between 
poverty and the number of people with disabilities.  So those who could benefit most 
from this more accessible mode do not have it available to them.  The neighborhood of 
Madureira, for example, has more than double the population of people with motor 
disabilities when compared to Barra da Tijuca (IPP 2013).  In addition, throughout the 
RMRJ over 70% of workers with some sort of physical disability receive only up to two 
minimum wages.  So, as the poorest are much more dependent on public transport 
modes for their displacement, the precarious accessibility conditions doubly affects the 
poor with disabilities. 
 
Figure 19.  Average Monthly Incomes of People with Disabilities in the RMRJ 
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Thus, remembering the indicators listed above that point to whether a transport 
system is exclusionary or contributes to social inclusion, Rio de Janeiro is failing on all 
accounts: the access to basic services for people who do not own cars, the affordability 
of tariffs for the lowest income segment of the population, and the accessibility of the 
system for people with disabilities.  The current system not only favors the rich, 
offering the best quality and fastest modes only in wealthy areas, it is prohibitively 
expensive for the poorest residents and is far from adequately serving those with limited 
mobility or disabilities.   
 
Paralympic Games 
 The upcoming Olympic and Paralympic Games have brought renewed interest 
in the subject of disability and fresh promises from politicians about making the city, 
and the country, more accessible.  In only a few short months the city will receive 4,350 
disabled athletes from 176 countries, but when asked how accessible Rio is on a scale of 
one to ten, Teresa Costa d’Amaral of the disability advocacy group IBDD30 says “zero” 
(Garcia-Navarro 2015).  
 According to Amaral, Brazil has some of the best legislation in the world on the 
issue of disability rights, but laws do not mean enforcement.  She also point to a 
pervading attitude of disrespect for disabled persons among the population, an attitude 
she is hopeful that the Paralympics will help to change (Ibid.)  The head of the Brazilian 
Paralympic Committee, Andrew Parsons, believes the games will help in this regard.  
"I think the Games have to be a catalyst for change but that change is different 
from the Olympics...When we speak about people with a disability or 
                                                
30 Brazilian Institute for the Rights of the Disabled Person 
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impairment we're talking about a diversity issue as well because we're trying to 
change the attitudes towards people with disabilities and who are different.  This 
is something the country needs very much and I think intolerance is 
everywhere…You see this throughout the world, because people hate what is 
different, and I think the Paralympics has the potential to change the perception 
and respect the difference.”  (Hudson 2015)    
 
 Concerning legislation, in 2014 Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff signed into 
law the Inclusion of People with Disabilities Act, which “eliminates accessibility 
barriers in transport, housing, services, education, sport and the exercise of citizenship.  
The new law also states that 2.7 per cent of the gross revenues of the federal lotteries 
should be invested in sports, up from the current level of 2 per cent” (NPC Brasil 2015).   
 The law promises great improvements for all of Brazil’s nearly 50 million 
people living with some sort of disability, but even in the host city, major projects have 
not been completed.  Major landmarks in the city are supposed to receive improvements 
so they are fully accessible, but so far only a forth have been completed (NHK 9 March 
2016).  One of these projects is making wheelchair accessible routes on Copacabana 
beach, but so far the work has not even begun.  
Conceding that the road to a more accessible city is still far from a reality, Rio 
Mayor Eduardo Paes says that the Paralympics are “not going to solve our problems, 
but things are gonna get much better for people with disabilities.  We have a long way 
to go.  The Olympics are not like a miracle that are gonna solve all the problems of the 
city" (Garcia-Navarro 2015).    
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Chapter 4: Fight for a Better System 
Free Fare Movement (MPL) 
In recent years, especially since 2003,31 intense struggles have been waged over 
public transport issues in cities across Brazil.  Protests have broken out because, more 
than just a technical matter, the current crisis has an eminently political character, and it 
is only by addressing this can the mobility problem be solved.  
Mobility, the ability to come and go in the city, is intrinsically linked to class in 
Rio de Janeiro, and throughout Brazil.  Those who have more money move more and 
with more ease; those with less money move less and with less ease.  At times, the 
poorest cannot move at all, trapped on the outskirts of cities because they cannot afford 
the high fare prices.  Thus, the public transport fare is a barrier, symbolically 
represented in the turnstile, which prevents and excludes those who do not have 
financial resources from moving around the city.   
Today, the group at the center of the fight against the unequal and exclusionary 
transport system in Brazil is the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), or Free Fare 
Movement.  The Free Fare Movement (MPL) is an autonomous social movement, 
horizontal in structure and ardently non-partisan.  It is independent and fights for a real 
public transportation, free for the whole population and outside of the private sector.  
The MPL emerged in 2005 as an organized expression of earlier urban transport 
struggles, most notably the “Buzu Revolt” (Revolta do Buzú) that took place in Salvador 
in 2003.  University students marched almost daily during August and September in 
response to what they felt was an abusive increase in the public transport (bus) fare.  In 
                                                
31 2003 was the year of the historic “Buzu Revolt” in Salvador. 
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response to the protests the city repealed the fare increase, creating, for the first time, 
the precedent of fare reduction.  Following the success in Salvador, student led 
demonstrations against fare increases spread to other cities such as Teresina, Natal, 
Vitória, Aracaju and Porto Velho, all of which also succeeded (MPL-SP 2013).  Despite 
these groups’ successes, they lacked legitimated people or groups able to mediate with 
the government.  Thus, the MPL was formed as a political expression wholly devoted to 
fare reductions and eliminations.    
The MPL argues the following: 
“In the process in which the population is always the object instead of the 
subject, the transport system is organized in a top-down manner according to the 
imperatives of the circulation of money.  In this way, the population is excluded 
from the organization of its own daily experience.  This organization is 
principally based on the transport system, which restricts the mobility to come 
and go from work and places turnstiles throughout the city.  When turnstiles are 
reinforced, the transport system’s contradictions become even more evident, 
which arouses resistance.  It is amidst this concrete experience in the fight 
against urban exclusion that the Free Fare Movement was forged.  ” (MPL- SP 
2013)32    
The MPL makes the transport fare issue an affirmation of the right to the city.  Free and 
unrestricted movement is an essential component of this right, “a city only exists for 
those who move around it.”33   
According the movement’s website, 35% of the population living in big cities 
does not have enough money to pay for the bus regularly (from IPEA 2013 on MPL 
                                                
32 Num processo em que a população é sempre objeto em vez de sujeito, o transporte é 
ordenado de cima, segundo os imperativos da circulação do valor. Dessa forma, a 
população é excluída da organização de sua própria experiência cotidiana da 
metrópole, organização essa que se realiza principalmente pelo sistema de transporte, 
o qual restringe a mobilidade ao ir e vir do trabalho e coloca catracas em todos os 
caminhos da cidade. E, no momento que se fortalecem as catracas, as contradições do 
sistema tornam-se mais evidentes, suscitando processos de resistência.  É em meio a 
essa experiência concreta da luta contra a exclusão urbana que se forjou o Movimento 
Passe Livre. 
33 This is a principal slogan of the MPL. 
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website).  Many people are excluded from education and public services because they 
cannot afford to take the bus or metro to and from these places.  This is only 
exacerbated with every fare increase.  Every time the fares increase, exclusion 
increases.  Thus, instead of fighting strictly against fare increases, the MPL fights 
against the very existence of the tariff.  They believe transport needs to be seen as an 
essential right, not a commodity (MPL-SP “Carta de Princípios”).   
 In early June 2013, when São Paulo’s municipal and state governments 
announced a hike in the public transportation fares from R$ 3.00 to R$ 3.20, the MPL 
was ready to respond.  As they had done many times before, the MPL organized a street 
protest in front of the city hall.  The first march in São Paulo mobilized a couple 
thousand protesters and was focused on public transportation.  The crowd marched to 
the chant of “if the fare doesn’t go down, the city will stop.”34  By the sixth “grande 
ato,” or march organized by the MPL, on June 20, many cities, including Rio, had 
indeed stopped.  Millions had taken to the streets of Brazil to publicize their revulsion at 
current conditions.  Many cities initially joined the protests as their own act of defiance 
against rising fare prices (in Rio the bus was set to increase from R$ 2.75 to R$ 3.00) 
and in solidarity with the São Paulo protesters who faced egregious police violence.  
This was the trigger that drew people to the streets, to directly intervene in the city’s 
politics, and exposed the depletion of the Brazilian everyday lifestyle in the urban 
context. 
By mid June, protests anger had mushroomed far beyond “20 cents.”  
“Transportation, infrastructure, health, education, housing, women-gay-indigenous-
                                                
34 The chant rhymes in Portuguese.  Se a tarifa nao baixar, a cidade vai parar! 
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black-citizen rights, corruption, political reform (parties, elections, congress), justice, 
security, environment, specific legislation, energy (nuclear, hydro, oil), and violence” 
had all become areas of grievance (Holston 2013).  However, the initial protests’ main 
agenda was the reduction of the fare increases.  On June 17, 2013, São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro governors announced that the fare increases would be halted.  This marked a 
major victory for the MPL, not only having their demands met, but proving that mass 
demonstrations could affect policy.   
“If taking back the urban space appears as a goal of the protests against the fare 
increase, it has also performed a role as a method in the practice of occupying 
the streets and directly determining their flows and uses.  The city is used as a 
weapon for its own recovery: knowing that only blocking a crossroad 
compromises the whole movement in the city, the population launches the 
metropolis chaotic transportation system against itself, a system that prioritizes 
individual transport and leaves people at the edge of collapsing.  In this process, 
people collectively assume the reins of their everyday life.  Therefore, the true 
popular management happens in the people’s direct action over their own life - 
and not behind closed doors, in municipal councils cleverly instituted by the 
municipalities or any other institutional chicanery.”  (MPL-SP 2013, p. 16) 
 
Although 2013 appeared to be a moment of hope and change, citizens 
demanding a “qualitatively different kind of urban society,” little has actually changed 
in the lives and commutes of V, A, R and D (from the beginning of the paper) (Harvey 
2008).  Since 2013, the public transport fares have continued to increase.  Although 
branches of the Free Fare Movement organize protests whenever the increases occur, 
none have been anywhere near the size or have had the impact of the June 2013 
protests.  Today, the basic fare prices are as follows (there are many different “combo 
prices,” example: Train+municipal bus is 6.50 or Train+Metro is 6.60, and other 





Boat (Rio-Niteroi): 5.60       
 
Policy Recommendations 
 The transportation issues discussed throughout this paper cannot be solved 
independently.  According to Campos (2013), the integration of urban land use, 
transportation, mobility, affordability and sustainability is the key to improving quality 
of life in cities.  Thus, it is necessary to combine efforts and rethink the patterns of 
occupation and use of urban land.  
After the large, nation-wide protests of 2013, the federal government created the 
Mobility Pact.  The Pact provided for the allocation of funds for 6 new urban mobility 
projects in the cities of Nova Iguaçu, Duque de Caxias and São Gonçalo.  To date, none 
of these works have been realized, or even moved beyond the planning phase (Brazil 
2013).  The same year, the government promised R$ 2.57 billion for the construction of 
metro Line 3 between Niteroi and São Gonçalo.  This project has long been a part of the 
political discourse, a frequently promised improvement, but construction has never 
actually started.  The current governor Rio de Janeiro, Luiz Fernando Pezão (PMDB), 
ensured the start of the works by 2015 during his 2014 election campaign.  Now, he has 
already changed his position, advocating the construction of a BRT corridor instead of a 
metro line (Moura 2015). 
The choice of the BRT could be a good alternative.  A study carried out by a 
technical team found that a BRT would be able to meet the demand by people who need 
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to travel between these cities.  Preliminary studies indicate that the demand of Line 3 
would be approximately 229,000 passengers per day (Moura 2015; Palmares 2013).  
This demand could be met by a BRT system.  The expected number of daily passengers 
on the Transoeste BRT is roughly equivalent to the demand of the proposed metro Line 
3.  The Transoeste BRT is expected to transport 230,000 passengers per day (with a 
capacity to serve 10,000-30,000 passengers per hour and per direction, depending on 
the amount of available vehicles) (Castro 2013; Rio de Janeiro 2014).   
In the case of the Mobility Pact, there was a failure of implementation; none of 
the plans moved beyond the discussion phase.  This is primarily due to two factors, lack 
of funds and lack of political will.  The city is without the necessary funds and 
struggling to meet previous commitments such as finishing the Metro Line 4 and BRT 
lines before the Olympics.  There is also little political will since bigger political and 
economic crisis has muffled the public outcries.  
 Likely, the problems faced by the residents of the periphery who work in the 
capital and need to make long daily commutes have no solution in the short term.  
“Increasing the traditional infrastructure won’t be of much help.  It is the role of the 
governments to make predictions and study the dynamics in which we’re living and find 
alternatives,” argues economist Persio Davison, advisor at the organization “Wheels of 
Peace,”35 in Brasília (Davison in Maciel 2014). 
One of these possible long-term alternatives is to develop incentives for the 
creation of secondary employment centers outside the capital that are served by the 
public transportation system.  According to Renata Florentino, from the Observatory of 
                                                
35 Rodas da Paz 
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the Metropolises, the debate over mobility must not disregard the subject of planning.  
The discussion must include moving jobs closer to where the people are and 
encouraging the construction of affordable homes in the big centers, where most job 
openings are located (Maciel 2014).  Additionally, the government should also work 
towards making public service offerings more widely available outside of the capital.  
These measures would open opportunities and minimize the number of long 
displacements for those living far from the capital.  
 In the short term, the government should hold the operators of the public 
transport modes accountable to quality and service standards.  Additionally, the 
government should create educational campaigns to discourage car use, instead 
highlighting the positive impacts of taking public transportation or non-motorized 
modes of transport.  However, this will likely be difficult due to concerns over quality 
and safety, especially since the collapse of part of the new bicycle path from Leblon to 
São Conrado.  Citizens worry that the projects, such as the Metro Line 4, are not safe 
due to their hasty completion and lack of oversight (Bacelar 2016). 
Lack of planning and implementation of the urban mobility system affects 
unequally the various groups of people, according to their social conditions and their 
dwelling places, leading to an increase in the average time lost in traffic.  This time 
could be used to carry out other activities, such as leisure, time with the family or 
gaining additional education.  Thus, public transport needs to be seen by policy makers 
as an essential service, an indispensable basic right that people can move freely to 
conduct their activities, leaving implicit the need to create conditions so that the space 




 The personal vehicle is deeply entrenched in Brazilian society and culture as 
both a “solution” to individual mobility needs and as a status symbol.  This cultural trait 
is very harmful and acts as an obstacle to any intervention attempt in the urban mobility 
system.  The growth of average household incomes during the 2000s and the 
government incentives provided for purchasing a car led to a flood of new vehicles (cars 
and motorcycles) on the city’s street and intensified the problem of urban mobility 
(Maciel 2014).  “The investment in individual motor vehicles totals eight to ten times as 
much as in collective ones.  Over the course of the years, this was reflected in the 
design of the cities, which favors car drivers.  This is unsustainable in the medium and 
long run” (Florentino in Ribeiro 2013).   
 These ineffective public policies, and lack of planning, have worsened the 
mobility in Rio de Janeiro, as seen by indicators such as home-work commute times.  
These commutes have become an increasingly stressful activity due to the constant 
increase in their average time and the corresponding loss of time that could be used for 
other activities.   
 Another cause, besides the increase in personal motorization rates, is the poor 
integration between the municipal and state governments.  Despite the Mayor of Rio, 
Eduardo Paes, and Governor, Luiz Fernando Pezão, both coming from the PMDB party, 
they have not been able to jointly develop policies to address the urban mobility issue in 
the RMRJ.  Similarly, there is a lack of coordination among the municipal leaders.  
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Since RMRJ mobility affects many municipalities, it is impossible to treat each in 
isolation.  This lack of integration hinders the development of infrastructure projects. 
 Another factor contributing to poor urban mobility is urban sprawl and 
disorderly land use, which has necessitated the movement of increasingly greater 
distances in order to go to work and take advantage of health services and education and 
leisure opportunities.  Jobs, schools, and hospitals are all much more readily available in 
areas with the highest purchasing power. 
 The result is an urban mobility system that restricts people’s Constitutionally 
guaranteed Right to the City.  Instead of opening the city to all inhabitants, the urban 
mobility system functions as a contributing factor to social exclusion and spatial 
segregation of the lower classes.  The upper classes have vastly greater access to the 
city, which is confirmed by the quality and quantity of public transport modes available 
to affluent neighborhoods and the lack of quality options in the poorest areas.  Thus, 
urban mobility’s main function, to allow all citizens to access the city in a democratic 
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